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You Don’t See What I See: Individual
Differences in the Perception of Meaning
from Visual Stimuli
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Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia
¤ Current address: King's College London, National Addictions Centre, 4 Windsor Walk, Denmark Hill,
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Abstract
Everyone has their own unique version of the visual world and there has been growing inter-
est in understanding the way that personality shapes one’s perception. Here, we investi-
gated meaningful visual experiences in relation to the personality dimension of schizotypy.
In a novel approach to this issue, a non-clinical sample of subjects (total n = 197) were pre-
sented with calibrated images of scenes, cartoons and faces of varying visibility embedded
in noise; the spatial properties of the images were constructed to mimic the natural statistics
of the environment. In two experiments, subjects were required to indicate what they saw in
a large number of unique images, both with and without actual meaningful structure. The
first experiment employed an open-ended response paradigm and used a variety of differ-
ent images in noise; the second experiment only presented a series of faces embedded in
noise, and required a forced-choice response from the subjects. The results in all conditions
indicated that a high positive schizotypy score was associated with an increased tendency
to perceive complex meaning in images comprised purely of random visual noise. Individu-
als high in positive schizotypy seemed to be employing a looser criterion (response bias) to
determine what constituted a ‘meaningful’ image, while also being significantly less sensi-
tive at the task than those low in positive schizotypy. Our results suggest that differences in
perceptual performance for individuals high in positive schizotypy are not related to
increased suggestibility or susceptibility to instruction, as had previously been suggested.
Instead, the observed reductions in sensitivity along with increased response bias toward
seeing something that is not there, indirectly implicated subtle neurophysiological differ-
ences associated with the personality dimension of schizotypy, that are theoretically perti-
nent to the continuum of schizophrenia and hallucination-proneness.
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Introduction
Like all human abilities and traits, there are individual differences in visual perception. Anec-
dotally, these can lead to seeing different things in a cloud-filled sky and appreciating particular
forms of abstract art [1]. Experimentally, these variations range from slight, and perhaps ran-
dom, fluctuations in performance across individuals [2–5], to considerable dissimilarities that
can be reliably traced to broader group differences in, for example, gender [6], personality [7],
culture [8], motivation [9], and the spectrum of psychosis [10, 11]. In the work described here
we use the commonplace observation of meaningful images in the clouds to construct stimuli
that allow us to measure individual differences in the inclination to see something in a
degraded, noisy stimulus when nothing is actually there.
Individual differences in perception
The visual system is predisposed to extract meaning, often from stimuli containing substantial
amounts of uncertainty; indeed one could argue that is its primary role. The meaning that is
imposed can depend on our internal templates of prototypical stimuli [12, 13] our expectations
and learned probabilities about the visual environment [9, 14–20], contextual cues or prior
visual input [21, 22] and on random neural fluctuations in functionally relevant areas of cortex
[23–26]. Each of these processes are also subject to influence by other factors such as the per-
sonality (or factors which influence personality) of the individual.
For instance, when subjects were presented with a sequence of line-drawings, starting with
an extremely degraded image that gradually became less degraded as the sequence progressed,
and asked to respond once they could identify the image, those who responded earlier in the
sequence, although less accurately, were those with stronger beliefs in paranormal phenomena
[27]. Stronger belief in the paranormal is also associated with a greater bias toward seeing an
illusory face during a signal-detection task that used real-world photographs, some of which
contained “artifact faces” [28], the tendency to attribute intention and animacy to sequences of
random motion [29], and to ascribe meaning to random sequences of everyday events [30].
Paranormal ‘believers’ also show a greater likelihood to see a face in a jumbled non-face, and a
word in a non-word compared to ‘skeptics’ [31]. Overall, the results imply an influence of the
internal state of the system (in this case a particular belief system) on the outcome of the pro-
cess of construction of meaning, with a role for both of expectations [9, 14–20] and prototypi-
cal templates [12, 13].
Schizotypy and perception
From a more generalised perspective, psychometric scales of personality have long been
thought to influence aspects of perception which, in turn, influences behaviour [32]. Belief in
extra-sensory perception and paranormal phenomena, and high scores on measures of psycho-
ticism and magical thinking can be contextualised in terms of the personality dimension of
schizotypy [31, 33]. The concept of schizotypy has often been employed within a dimensional
approach to psychosis, whereby psychopathological symptoms are thought to form a quantita-
tive continuum with normal, healthy traits [34–36]. The presence of schizotypal traits, even at
relatively high levels, does not imply impaired functioning [37], but may be indicative of risk
for psychosis-spectrum disorders [38, 39]. The normal personality traits comprising schizotypy
typically cluster mainly into three subtypes: positive-psychotic, positive-disorganized, and nega-
tive, with a fourth subtype becoming increasingly, although not universally, recognized impul-
sive/ antisocial [40, 41]. Of particular interest for the present research is what has been termed
the positive-psychotic subtype, which encompasses distorted or intense subjective sensory expe-
riences and minor manifestations of delusional beliefs. This dimension also correlates well to
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various measures of creativity, contributing to the concept of the ‘healthy schizotype’ with
which we concur [42–44], and we stress that in no way does any given schizotypy score imply a
clinical diagnosis.
Experimentally, when observers were presented with a random array of white dots on a
black background and (misleadingly) instructed that the dots sometimes show something
meaningful, individuals who score higher on questionnaire measures of psychoticism, neuroti-
cism, and hallucination-proneness are more likely to report perceiving meaningful images of a
complex nature in the dots [45]. Such complex false alarms on this Random Dots Task (RDT)
have also been associated with belief in extra-sensory perception [46], magical thinking and
positive schizotypy [47]. Individuals high in positive schizotypy also see more words in a
dynamic string of non-word strings than low-scoring individuals [48], mirroring the result
from similar work with paranormal believers [31]. This effect is strengthened when the fre-
quency of real words is increased [18], and is mediated by expectation, even when that expecta-
tion is not met [16]. These data are consistent with perceptual biases that predispose those high
in positive-psychotic traits to have measurable false perceptions.
Hallucination as a visual false-alarm
From a stimulus-based perspective, the strengths of visual illusions are mediated by various
aspects of individual difference and clinical diagnosis [49–51], and there is evidence that both
illusions and false-perceptions (or hallucinations) arise, at least in part, from the same mecha-
nisms as ‘veridical’ perception. For instance, changes in local cortical blood flow are similar
when an individual is looking at either illusory or ‘real’ contours [52], studies of the McCul-
lough Effect [53] suggest the illusory colours inherent in the illusion are mediated through the
same mechanism as the percept of the coloured adapting stimulus [54], and there is mounting
evidence for common mechanisms mediating hallucinations and shared perception [55, 56].
The results outlined above suggest that illusions and hallucinations can be conceptualised as
“visual false alarms”; an approach that fits within a probabilistic framework of vision and brain
function [15, 17, 57], and is consistent with the tone of the argument characteristic of the litera-
ture. The overall aim of this work is to use the visual false alarm in this context to examine how
personality interacts with perception.
The current study
From a task-driven perspective, while much previous work used artificial stimuli and subjective
judgements open to suggestibility [58, 59], the two experiments presented here outline the
development and use of a more ecologically valid and controlled visual stimulus in a signal-
detection task paradigm, allowing us to more confidently attribute performance to perceptual
differences between individuals (see also [28, 31, 48]).
From a stimulus-driven perspective, we suggest that it is common to see apparently mean-
ingful images in clouds because of their particular spatial structure, where the power in a given
spatial frequency-band has an approximately reciprocal relationship to frequency (1/ f, where f
is the spatial frequency), and the fractal characteristic of self-similarity across scale [60]. These
structural visual properties stimulate the system relatively evenly across its range of sensitivity
at early visual stages [61], and can be considered to create an overall increase in ‘noise’, or
uncorrelated signal. Since it could be argued that the system’s primary role is to make sense of
an input—whatever it may be—such overall stimulation can increase the likelihood of false
correlations over space (and time); the perceptual consequence of this may be to see more than
is present in the input.
The Perception of Meaning
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Consideration of the statistical properties of natural scenes has been fruitful for understand-
ing the way the visual system works [62–65]. The observation that natural scenes possess an
approximately 1/f amplitude spectra and that the visual system may be particularly well
adapted to this is used here to develop more ‘natural’ stimuli, to give greater ecological validity
to the task [61, 66, 67]. To distinguish the task we refer to it as the Perception of Meaning task
(or POM where the use of an acronym does not compromise readability).
Consistent with the literature reviewed above, we suggest that positive-psychotic personality
traits (as measured by the Unusual Experiences sub-scale of the Schizotypy metric) mediate the
occurrence of visual false alarms, and that using ecologically valid stimuli in an appropriately
controlled psychophysical paradigm will enable this to be measured more effectively in a nor-
mal population. We expect that those individuals which score highly on Unusual Experiences
will experience more visual false alarms and that our paradigm will allow us to discriminate
between sensitivity and bias in the subjects, as well as removing any influence of suggestibility
on the data.
General Methods
Two experiments will be reported here, both examine the interaction between personality and
perception. The first will pilot the Perception Of Meaning task and critically compare it to its
closest predecessor, Jakes and Hemsley’s (1986) Random Dots Task outlined in the introduc-
tion. The second experiment will examine performance on a modified and improved signal-
detection style version of the POM, and concurrently investigate the role of participants’ expec-
tations of the stimuli on perception [12, 13, 16]. Common aspects of the methodology with be
described in this section, with the complementary specifics at the head of each Experiment.
Participants
Experiment 1 comprised 102 undergraduate psychology students (68% females) who took part
in exchange for course credit. Ages ranged from 16 to 44 years (M = 20.0 years, SD = 4.6).
Experiment 2 comprised 95 undergraduate psychology students (72% females) ranging in age
from 17 to 41 years (M = 19.8 years, SD = 4.3). None of the participants in Experiment 2 had
taken part in Experiment 1. Both studies were approved by the Human Ethics Advisory Group
at the University of Melbourne and each participant provided written consent for participation
and publication of their (anonymous) data.
Questionnaire measures
Participants in Experiment 1 completed the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experi-
ences (O-LIFE) [68], which is a 108-item yes/ nomeasure of schizotypy with four subscales
(Unusual Experiences ‘UnEx’ for positive-psychotic, Cognitive Disorganization ‘CogDis’ for
positive-disorganized; Introvertive Anhedonia ‘IntAnh’ for negative; and Impulsive Nonconfor-
mity ‘ImpNon’ for the impulsive/ antisocial subtype of schizotypy). The Vividness of Visual
Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) [69], and Gudjonsson’s Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility
(GSIS) [70] were also administered as control measures. The VVIQ is a 16-item questionnaire
that asks respondents to mentally conjure and rate the vividness of features in four visual
scenes (the face of a friend, the rising sun, a familiar shop-front, and a country scene). During
this portion of the procedure, subjects were free to close their eyes, or keep them open; most
subjects closed their eyes (see note in Experiment 1, discussion). The GSIS is an interview-style
measure where respondents are read a short vignette and are then asked 20 questions relating
to the story, 15 of which are leading questions regarding information that was never provided.
Regardless of their accuracy, respondents are firmly told they have made a number of errors
The Perception of Meaning
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and asked the same questions again, with instructions to try and be more accurate. Responses
are scored on the basis of accurate Recall (20 items) and two aspects of suggestibility: Yield (15
items)–the number of leading questions initially responded to in the leading direction, and
Shift (15 items)–the number of leading questions the respondent changed their answer to upon
being asked the second time. A total GSIS suggestibility score can be calculated by summing
the Yield and Shift scores.
In Experiment 2, participants completed only the UnEx, CogDis, and ImpNon subscales of
the O-LIFE. IntAnh was omitted due to time constraints and because it was of least theoretical
interest.
Psychophysical tasks and equipment
All image manipulation, coding, and presentation of experiments was carried out using the
Matlab computer language [71] and the Psychophysics Toolbox [72]. All images were 8-bit
monochrome greyscale, containing up to 256 shades of grey, ranging from black to white. The
images were composed of a square matrix of pixels (1024 × 1024 (16 deg square) for Experi-
ment 1, and 512 × 512 (8 deg square) for Experiment 2). The effective pixel size (spatial resolu-
tion) was the same for each experiment and a property of the generation hardware, but the
overall image size was restricted by the database used in each case (Experiment 1 [73], Experi-
ment 2 [74]). Stimuli were presented on a 23-inch (1920 × 1200 pixel resolution at 60 Hz, with
a mean luminance of 40 cd/m2) Apple Cinema Display monitor, powered by a G4 Apple Power-
Book. The voltage to luminance relationship of the display was approximately linear over the
range used through the Apple standard gamma correction; this correction was considered ade-
quate given the nature of the stimuli and task of the observer. Later work presenting the images
on a fully calibrated CRT display has yielded similar data [43, 75, 76]. Presentation took place
in a darkened room with participants seated at a distance of 964 mm from the screen supported
with a chin-rest, such that one degree of visual angle corresponded to 64 screen pixels. Experi-
mental sessions were conducted one-to-one and lasted approximately 90 minutes.
Image generation—general
Monochrome pictures were combined with artificially generated two-dimensional noise to cre-
ate visually degraded images. Experiment 1 combined the image and noise through the stan-
dard practice of addition of a given proportion of noise to an ‘image’ value within each pixel
[23, 77]. Experiment 2, however, in an important variation from Experiment 1, spatially
degraded the image on an alternate pixel by pixel basis. This novel spatial degradation process
meant that pre-specified proportions of image pixels were randomly designated as either signal
or noise. Thus, what was degraded was the degree to which the individual signal pixels correlate
across space to generate a meaningful representation (Experiment 2), rather than the degree to
which a single pixel in space is able to represent the signal (Experiment 1). The extent to which
the visual system can discriminate between individual pixels and the precise signal to noise
pixel structure will influence the effective difference between these two processes. This second
method of image degradation has similarities to the phase-alignment method used recently by
Hansen and colleagues [78]
To create each stimulus pair, a normalised 8-bit monochrome (meaningful) signal image
was randomly positioned within a pixel grid of random 2D noise of similar dimensions and
mean luminance and with an amplitude spectra of 1/f (where f is the spatial frequency) to cre-
ate pink-noise (as opposed to a a flat amplitude spectrum across spatial frequency, termed
white-noise). A companion noise-only image was also created with the same mean and range
of pixel values and the same RMS contrast. These were then combined to create a composite
The Perception of Meaning
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image where the noise was added to the signal pixel values and then normalised (Experiment
1), or a percentage of pixels were from the signal image and the remainder from the noise
image (Experiment 2), again with the same RMS contrast to remove contrast as cue to the pres-
ence of an image. A further noise-only image was also paired with each signal image as its non-
signal counterpart. The image pairs were then band-pass filtered (using a Fast Fourier Trans-
form and Gaussian filter inMatlab) in the spatial frequency domain to contain different octave
bands of spatial frequencies, centred at (0.5), 1, 2, 4, 8, or (16) c/deg at the specified viewing dis-
tance (frequencies in parentheses used in Experiment 1 only). This process is summarised in
Fig 1a and 1b and experiment-specific details given below.
Approach to the data and analysis
In this work we are interested in how different aspects of personality affect performance on the
psychophysical tasks. As outlined in the introduction we have the most theoretical interest in
the positive dimension (UnEx and CogDis in the O-LIFE), although we did examine all dimen-
sions at the outset, and where possible we examined and included all dimensions of the
O-LIFE, despite being aware of differing views as to the relevance of all four [40, 41]. We also
analyse and present the data in a way consistent with our theoretical approach to the study;
that personality is related to psychophysical performance in our particular task.
Furthermore, we analyse the data both from a continuous and dichotomous perspective to
facilitate comparison with previous work [16, 45]. In order to designate respondents as low or
high on a given schizotypal dimension a median-split was computed on the scores in order to
compare our results to previous work. We are mindful of the potential issues of conducting a
median split on continuous data e.g. [79–82], and perform regression analyses to ensure we do
not rely on a single method of data treatment, while maintaining some consistency with previ-
ous work. We examined the data in all regression analyses for multi-collinearity and in no
instance was the variance inflation factor (VIF) greater than 2 or the tolerance less than 0.6,
indicating that multi-collinearity was not an issue. We have chosen to report both the continu-
ous and dichotomous results in most cases. Missing data was accounted for on an analysis-by-
analysis basis, which accounts for minor variations in subject number (n) in some analyses.
Finally, we provide the Bayesian statistical analysis of the critical data as Supporting Informa-
tion (S1 Appendix).
Experiment 1
Methodological specifics
Procedure. The two visual stimulus sets used in Experiment 1 were an adaptation of the
Random Dots Task or RDT [45], and the newly developed Perception Of Meaning (POM) task.
Similar instructions were given for completing both tasks, with participants told that they
would be seeing a number of images, some of which contained something meaningful, and to
describe out loud what they saw if and when they saw something meaningful or recognisable.
Each image appeared on screen for 6 seconds before automatically changing to the next, for a
total presentation time of approximately 18 minutes (180 stimuli in total). The order of images
was randomised so each subject saw them in a different sequence. The experimenter sat about
2 metres behind the participant and recorded their responses verbatim, while remaining as
unobtrusive as possible. The order of completion of the questionnaires (O-LIFE, VVIQ, and
GSIS) and visual tasks (RDT and POM) was counterbalanced using a Latin square design, and
order had no significant effects on the outcomes of interest.
Image generation specifics. Eight photographs of natural scenes (e.g. forests, clouds)
taken from the van Hateren image database [73] and seven cartoon style line drawings (mostly
The Perception of Meaning
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Fig 1. Creation of stimuli for Perception of Meaning (POM) task. Flow diagram representing the creation of the stimuli for the POM task used in
Experiment 1 (1a) and Experiment 2 (1b). FC = central frequency.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.g001
The Perception of Meaning
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of anthropomorphised animals) taken from an online database [83] formed the basis for the
signal stimuli. Paired with the noise stimuli and band-pass filtered to 6 different spatial fre-
quency brackets, the final stimulus set therefore comprised 90 signal and 90 noise stimuli (see
Fig 1a), which were randomly intermixed prior to presentation such that no two participants
viewed them in the same order. They were presented in a single block of 180 images. Stimuli
for the RDT were created by generating 60 random arrays of 400 dots filling a space the same
size as the images of the POM. From the viewing distance used, each image subtended 16° ×
16° of visual angle on the retina, and was presented for 6 seconds in a rectangular temporal
envelope.
Signal detection theory specifics. Detailed responses to the RDT (e.g. scenes, faces, or fig-
ures) were classified complex false alarms, whereas basic responses (e.g. simple geometric
shapes, letters, or numerals) were classified simple false alarms, according to Jakes and Hems-
ley’s (1986) criteria. These criteria were also used to classify false alarm responses to the POM.
In addition, misinterpreted responses to the POM signal stimuli that were incorrect and greatly
removed from their actual content (e.g. “a dragon fighting a dinosaur” in response to an image
of leaves on the ground) were also classified as false alarms using these criteria.
There were no images embedded in the RDT, so no hits or misses per se could be recorded
although, arguably, a null response could be classified as a hit or a miss in this case. The hit rate
for the POM in Experiment 1 was calculated as the total number of hits divided by the total
number of signal stimuli, whereas the false alarm rate was the total number of false alarms
divided by the total number of stimuli (hits + noise) to allow for the inclusion of these misinter-
pretations of the signal stimuli. This methodology differs from traditional signal detection
methods where false alarm rates are calculated as the total number of false alarms divided by
the total number of noise stimuli only. As such, the conventional rules of signal detection the-
ory where the hit rate is equal to 1 minus the miss rate, and the false alarm rate is equal to 1
minus the correct rejection rate do not strictly apply to this data, although the relationships are
a fairly close approximation.
Results and Interim Discussion
Descriptive statistics
Scores on the questionnaire measures are summarised in Table 1, and are all comparable to
reported norms for these psychometrics [69, 70, 84, 85]. Scores on the IntAnh subscale of the
O-LIFE were positively skewed and so square root transformations were computed to correct
for this, and the transformed scores were used in all parametric analyses.
The mean complex false alarm rates in response to the RDT (M = 11.4%, SD = 13.7) and the
POM (M = 9.0%, SD = 8.5) were comparable, t(101) = .034, p> .05, and highly correlated r =
.624, p< .01. The mean hit rate for the POM was 53.3% (SD = 11.0). Square root transforma-
tions were required to correct for positive skew for the complex and simple false alarm rates on
both the RDT and the POM. A qualitative analysis of complex false alarm responses to the
POM showed that 36% contained human faces or facial features, 25% animals or mythical crea-
tures, 20% humanoid figures, 15% natural objects or scenes, and 4% other. It should be noted
that all images in the RDT tasks were noise only, so there were no ‘hits’ or ‘misses’ per se, just
images in which the subjects saw something or did not.
The correlations between the personality measures and performance on the two visual tasks
are presented in Table 2, which indicates that positive-psychotic schizotypy (as measured by
UnEx scores) was the only measure to be consistently associated with performance. This was
reflected in the Bayesian correlation (see S1 Appendix) with a moderately high Bayes factor of
The Perception of Meaning
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20.9, supporting the correlation between the UnEx score and the complex false alarms in the
Perception of Meaning task.
The effect of personality on visual false alarms
Four blockwise hierarchical linear regression analyses, predicting the complex and simple false
alarm rates on the RDT and the POM, were conducted. UnEx scores were entered in the first
step, and the remaining schizotypy measures, suggestibility scores, and visual imagery scores
were entered blockwise in the second step. This established whether these measures contrib-
uted to predicting false alarm rates once the effects of positive-psychotic schizotypy had been
accounted for. Table 3 (left shaded columns) shows that UnEx scores accounted for 5% of the
variance in complex responses and 4% of the variance in simple responses on the RDT. For
Table 1. Summary statistics (untransformed) for the questionnaire measures used in Experiment 1.
Mean Median SD Observed range
O-LIFE
Unusual Experiences 13.3 14.0 5.6 0–26
Cognitive Disorganization 13.3 14.0 5.3 0–24
Introvertive Anhedonia 5.0 4.0 4.2 0–18
Impulsive Nonconformity 11.0 11.0 4.0 1–20
GSIS
Recall 13.5 14.0 2.8 2–20
Yield 5.4 5.0 3.0 1–13
Shift 4.7 4.0 2.6 1–12
Total 10.0 10.0 4.7 2–20
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 41.7 45.0 14.6 1–60
Note: O-LIFE = Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences GSIS = Gudjonsson Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.t001
Table 2. Correlations between questionnaire measures and performance on the two visual tasks used in Experiment 1.
UnEx CogDis IntAnh ImpNon GSIS Y GSIS S VVIQ
N 102 102 102 102 97 97 102
RDT Complex FA .215* -.190 -.086 -.063 -.067 .164 .086
RDT Simple FA .212* -.066 -.190 .057 .031 .248* .066
POM Complex FA .327** -.086 -.048 .085 .028 .116 -.004
POM Simple FA .216* -.074 -.140 .030 .003 .158 .071
POM Hits .301** -.030 -.229* .156 -.018 -.054 -.053
POM Misses -.376** .115 .176 -.090 .001 -.115 .009
POM CR -.323** .042 .070 -.085 -.048 -.184 -.081
Note: RDT = Random Dots Task; POM = Perception Of Meaning task; FA = False alarm; CR = Correct rejection; O-LIFE = Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of
Feelings and Experiences total score (subscales: UnEx = Unusual Experiences, CogDis = Cognitive Disorganization, IntAnh = Introvertive Anhedonia, and
ImpNon = Impulsive Nonconformity); GSIS = Gudjonsson Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility (Y = Yield score, S = Shift score, and T = Total score—note
that all correlations for the GSIS are partial correlations controlling for recall); VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire.
All images in the RDT task are ‘noise only’ images, so there were not ‘hits’ or ‘misses’ per se.
* p < .05,
** p < .01 (two-tailed).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.t002
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complex responses, the remaining personality variables made a significant contribution in the
second step, accounting for a further 19% of the variance. In the final model higher UnEx and
GSIS shift scores increased, whereas higher CogDis scores decreased the rate of complex
responses. None of the other personality measures made a significant contribution to predict-
ing simple response rates on the RDT once the effects of UnEx had been accounted for. UnEx
scores also made a significant contribution to predicting false alarm rates on the POM,
accounting for 10% of the variance in complex false alarm rates and 5% of the variance in sim-
ple false alarm rates (see Table 3, rightmost columns). The addition of the remaining personal-
ity variables did not result in a statistically significant increase to the variance already
accounted for by UnEx, either for complex or simple false alarm rates on the POM. It should be
Table 3. Summary of four hierarchical block-wise regression analyses (forced entry) for personality measures predicting complex and simple
false alarm rates (rows) on the RandomDots Task and the Perception Of Meaning (columns) task in Experiment 1 (N = 99).
Random Dots task Perception Of Meaning task
B SE B β B SE B β
Complex responses (false alarms)
Step 1. R2 = .05, p < .05 R2 = .10, p < .005
Constant 1.54. 0.56 1.59 0.36
Unusual Experiences 0.083 0.038 .21* .081 0.025 .32**
Step 2. ΔR2 = .19, p < .005 ΔR2 = .08, p = .27
Constant 4.45 2.09 2.52 1.43
Unusual Experiences 0.15 0.043 .38*** 0.11 0.029 .45***
Cognitive Disorganization -0.15 0.043 -.38*** -0.078 0.029 -.30**
Introvertive Anhedonia 0.021 0.22 .009 0.097 0.15 .066
Impulsive Nonconformity -0.059 0.056 -.11 -0.014 0.038 -.041
GSIS yield -0.15 0.078 -.20 -0.016 0.053 -.035
GSIS shift 0.23 0.088 .28** 0.087 0.060 .16
GSIS recall -0.052 0.082 -.069 0.012 0.056 .025
VVIQ -0.49 0.80 -.062 -0.56 0.55 -.11
Simple responses (false alarms)
Step 1 R2 = .04, p < .05 R2 = .05, p < .05
Constant 0.63 0.36 1.13 0.19
Unusual Experiences 0.50 0.025 .20* 0.031 0.013 .23*
Step 2 ΔR2 = .13, p = .69 ΔR2 = .05, p = .69
Constant 0.53 1.42 1.46 0.79
Unusual Experiences 0.052 0.029 .21 0.037 0.016 .27*
Cognitive Disorganization -0.052 0.029 -.20 -0.023 0.016 -.16
Introvertive Anhedonia -0.24 0.15 -.17 -0.046 0.085 -.059
Impulsive Nonconformity 0.004 0.038 .013 -0.003 0.021 -.015
GSIS yield -0.032 0.053 -.069 -0.023 0.030 -.093
GSIS shift 0.15 0.060 .28* 0.048 0.033 .17
GSIS recall 0.053 0.055 .11 0.001 0.031 .004
VVIQ -0.042 0.55 -.008 -0.064 0.30 -.023
Note: GSIS = Gudjonsson Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility; VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire.
* p < .05,
** p < .01,
*** p < .001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.t003
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noted, however, that CogDis scores did make a significant contribution to predicting complex
false alarm rates in the second step of the regression, with POM false alarm rates decreasing as
CogDis scores increased. This is an unexpected result, but may possibly be related to social anx-
iety and neuroticism, which is reflected in an increasing CogDis score [86]; if this increase in
anxiety causes the subjects to moderate they complex FA responses, for fear of seeming odd.
We thank one of our reviewers (O.F.) for this tentative but interesting suggestion.
Overall, our measure of positive-psychotic schizotypy, theUnEx score, had the strongest asso-
ciation with participants’ tendency to perceive complex meaning in the random stimuli of both
the RDT and the new POM. Visual imagery ability, as measured by the VVIQ, was not associated
with performance, so it is less likely that false alarms resulted from an effortful attempt to ‘make
out’meaningful images in the noise, and plausible that they arose spontaneously in a manner
analogous to visual hallucinations, especially given that their occurrence was linked to an aspect
of personality suggested to lie on a continuum with the positive symptoms of psychosis. How-
ever, we note that one potential limitation of Experiment 1 was that we did not control whether
participants completed the imagery task with open or closed eyes. It is possible that those com-
pleting it with closed eyes may have obtained higherVVIQ scores, which may have contaminated
the effects of any association between imagery and schizotypy scores, or scores on the POM.
On the RDT, however, suggestibility also played a role, with those participants who were
more likely to alter their responses due to experimenter instruction (indexed by the GSIS Shift
scores) also more likely to report false alarms. Suggestibility did not impact performance on
the POM. This coupled with the absence of any misleading experimenter instructions, as well
as the more sophisticated and naturalistic characteristics of the noise stimuli, indicate the POM
to be a promising tool for measuring hallucination proneness in laboratory settings with good
discriminant and construct validity.
For consistency with previous work, and clarity of presentation, a 2 × 4 ANOVA was con-
ducted using the median split of UnEx scores across the 4 indicators of hallucination proneness
(the simple and complex false alarm rates on the RDT and the POM). The high UnEx group
made significantly more false alarms than the low scorers. Details are presented in the Support-
ing Information (S1 Appendix) but the result is summarised in Fig 2. Ultimately this is the
same result as the regression above, and based on the same hierarchical linear model, but pre-
sented in a more digestible format.
Fig 2. 2x4 ANOVA of the rates of simple and complex false alarm responses. Response rates for simple
and complex responses (false alarms) on the RandomDots Task (RDT) and the Perception Of Meaning task
(POM), shown separately for individuals scoring below and above the median on theUnEx subscale of the
O-LIFE (N = 102, error bars represent ±95% confidence intervals).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.g002
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The effect of spatial frequency-band on visual false alarms
The final analysis was concerned with investigating the effect of positive-psychotic schizotypy
on the complex false alarm rates on the POM across the different spatial frequency bands. A 2
(median split of UnEx) × 6 (spatial frequency brackets) ANOVA was conducted to address this
question and the results are presented in Fig 3. A violation of the assumption of sphericity was
indicated by Mauchly’s test, χ2(14) = 91.9, so Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments (ε = .688) were
made to the degrees of freedom. A significant main effect of spatial frequency was observed, F
(5, 500) = 70.3, p< .001, ηp
2 = .413, reflecting the fact that complex false alarms were more
prevalent at the lower spatial frequencies. The interaction between UnEx and spatial frequency
was also significant, F(5, 500) = 4.3, p< 005, ηp
2 = .041. Post-hoc comparisons revealed the dif-
ferences between the low and high UnEx groups to be significant at 0.5 c/deg and 1 c/deg (p<
.001) and also at 2 c/deg and 16 c/deg (p< .05). The presence of the U-shaped curve was cor-
roborated by a statistically significant quadratic trend in complex false alarm rates with increas-
ing spatial frequency, F(1, 100) = 37.2, p< .001, ηp
2 = .271.
Lower frequency bands elicited more false alarms than higher ones, an effect that was exag-
gerated for individuals high on UnEx. There is some evidence that low spatial frequencies are
processed more rapidly than higher ones [87], although this will likely depend upon the precise
task at hand. In addition, according to some theories (e.g. [58]), hallucinators take less time to
form perceptual judgements, a similar effect having been observed in non-clinical populations
where belief in the paranormal was associated with responding earlier (when less information
was available) and making incorrect identifications of image-series decreasing sequentially in
their level of degradation [27]. We speculate that this earlier response might therefore be exag-
gerated with low spatial frequency information.
Overall, the results of Experiment 1 showed that the noise-based (POM) stimuli amplified
the effect originally seen for the dot (RDT) stimuli [45]; whereby a high UnEx O-LIFE score
was correlated to the likelihood of seeing a meaningful image when there was nothing present.
This validates our contention that a more ecologically valid stimulus increases individual dif-
ferences in the imposition of meaning. The second experiment extends this result to examine
the same effect in a signal detection framework. We also vary the spatial frequency content of
the image (as in Experiment 1) and the observer’s expectation that there will be a meaningful
image present [16].
Fig 3. 2x6 ANOVA of the rates of complex false alarm responses as a function of spatial frequency.
Response rates for complex false alarms on the Perception Of Meaning task (POM) across the 6 spatial
frequency bands, shown separately for individuals scoring below and above the median on the UnEx
subscale of theO-LIFE (N = 102, error bars represent ±95% confidence intervals).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.g003
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Experiment 2
Methodological specifics
Procedure. All participants completed the UnEx, CogDis, and ImpNon subscales of the
O-LIFE prior to the POM, so they could be pseudo-randomly allocated into one of three
experimental conditions, ensuring an even distribution of UnEx scores within each group. In
order to manipulate subjects’ expectations, prior to commencing the POM, participants were
told to expect 25% (Group 1), 50% (Group 2: the control condition), or 75% (Group 3) of the
stimuli in the POM to contain a face; in reality, 50% of stimuli contained a face for all three
groups. Responses were made on the computer keyboard, where participants were instructed
to press the ‘L’ key if they detected a face and the ‘A’ key if they did not (these keys were
reversed for half the participants). The importance of accuracy and speed were both empha-
sised, and reaction times were recorded. It should be noted that responses were made on a lap-
top with an integrated keyboard so the losses in reaction time accuracy associated with a
peripheral USB keyboard were avoided. The reaction times were also in accord with those of
another study, measured using separate and calibrated button boxes (RTBox and a Cedrus
box) [43, 76].
The practice block of the POM was administered first, during which accurate audible feed-
back was provided. Each stimulus trial commenced with a blank screen prompting partici-
pants to press the spacebar, a fixation cross on a black screen of mean luminance then
appeared for 1000 ms. An audible beep signalled the onset of the stimulus, which was pre-
sented for exactly 1000 ms (rectangular temporal envelope), followed by another blank screen.
The stimulus remained on screen for exactly 1000 ms, regardless of when the participant
made their response; this is represented in Fig 4. The stimuli were presented for a shorter
duration than Experiment 1, and were also only 8 deg square. Participants were able to
respond at any time during the 3000 ms interval following the onset of the stimulus.
Responses made after this time were not recorded. Only the practice block gave feedback as to
the observers response, and the subjects were not informed how many faces to expect until
after the practice block. In the test trials there was no feedback and signal stimuli were present
50% of the time in all conditions, despite the three expectation groups.
Fig 4. Schematic diagram of the presentation sequence for a single trial during the Perception Of
Meaning task used in Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.g004
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Image generation specifics. The POM task used in Experiment 2 was modified to allow
for signal detection analysis so performance could be separated into factors relating to sensi-
tivity (Dˈ) and response criterion (β) [88, 89]. This required that participants respond in a uni-
form manner to all signal stimuli, rather than describing what they saw, so the content of the
signal stimuli had to be homogeneous. Faces were chosen for this purpose, partly because they
were the most predominant spontaneous response to the open-ended POM used in Experi-
ment 1. Twenty frontal photographs of human faces (10 male and 10 female) with neutral
expressions, ranging in age from 19 to 37 years, taken from the database of the Productive
Ageing Laboratory [74] formed the basis of the signal stimulus set. Each face was manually
cropped to contain only the facial features without the hair or neck, and then pseudo-ran-
domly positioned within a square background of 1/f noise, such that it was not necessarily in a
central or uniform location. A typical face subtended 3.2° × 4° of visual angle within an 8° × 8°
background. As described above, in a departure from the standard procedure adopted in
Experiment 1, signal stimuli were degraded by pixel replacement rather than addition, with
the percentage of signal pixels replaced by noise being 70, 75, or 77%. This range of stimulus
image degradation was chosen to cover an approximate range close to threshold (image just
visible for prolonged exposure through pilot observation). This varied for each specific image
and each observer, but given the group design was a necessary step to allow presentation of a
greater number of noise/image combinations which, in turn, we felt would facilitate the false-
alarm response. Given the number of hits measured we were reassured this restricted range
was adequate.
Images were degraded through the pixel replacement procedure prior to band-pass filtering,
and only 4 spatial-frequency bands were used (centred at 1, 2, 4, or 8 c/deg) for Experiment 2.
The final stimulus set thus comprised 240 signal and 240 noise stimuli, each one unique (see
Fig 1b). To minimise participant fatigue, these were presented in 4 blocks, each comprising 120
stimuli with an even distribution of noise and spatial frequency bands. A practice block of a
unique set of 96 stimuli (based on 8 new faces) was also created.
Results and Interim Discussion
Descriptive statistics
Brief demographics and schizotypy scores for the three experimental expectation groups are
summarised in Table 4. No significant group differences were observed on any of these mea-
sures. Considering all three groups together, the mean false alarm rate for the signal detection
version of the POM used in Experiment 2 was 23.1% (SD = 15.4%), whereas the hit rate was
62.6% (SD = 9.7%), both somewhat higher than the rates for the open-ended version of the
POM used in Experiment 1. The mean sensitivity (Dˈ) score was 1.2 (SD = 0.5) and ranged
between 0.4 and 2.2, indicating that all participants were able to distinguish the faces from the
noise stimuli with some degree of accuracy. The mean response criterion (β) score was 2.0
(SD = 1.8) and ranged between 0.6 and 10.8. A score of β = 1 represents no response bias for an
ideal observer. In our sample, 29.5% of participants obtained a β score below 1, indicating a
bias toward responding as having seen a face, with the remainder scoring above 1, indicative of
a bias toward responding as not having seen a face. False alarm rates and response criterion
scores were both positively skewed, so square-root and inverse transformations (FASQ =p
(FA); βINV = 1 –[1 / (β + 1)]), were respectively applied prior to any parametric analyses.
The mean reaction time (RT) was 778 ms (SD = 141 ms) for hits andM = 911 ms (SD = 244
ms) for false alarms. We computed a difference score for each individual by subtracting their
RT for hits from their RT for false alarms, such that a positive value would indicate faster RTs
for hits than false alarms. The mean difference score was 133 ms (SD = 166 ms), a value
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significantly greater than 0, t(94) = 7.8, p< .0001, indicating that a speed-accuracy trade-off
was unlikely to be occurring during the POM, as correct responses (hits) were faster than incor-
rect ones. RT difference scores did not differ by UnEx scores, t(94) = 0.11, p> .05. We also con-
ducted t-tests to compare the mean reaction times for hits and false alarms, and at the four
different spatial frequencies for participants below and above the median on UnEx. While the
high UnEx group did tend to respond faster, none of the differences were statistically signifi-
cant (all p> .05). These data are plotted in Fig 5.
The effect of personality on POM performance
To assess the effects of schizotypy and expectations on POM performance, four blockwise hier-
archical linear regression analyses were conducted. Results are shown in Table 5. Only UnEx
scores were entered in the first block, to observe the unadjusted effects of positive-psychotic
schizotypy. Higher UnEx scores were associated with significantly more false alarms, lower
sensitivity, and lower response criterion, but no difference in hit rates. These effects, collapsed
across the 3 expectation conditions, are shown graphically in Fig 6, where POM performance is
shown separately for those scoring below and above the median on UnEx.
Fig 5. Reaction times to respond to the Perception Of Meaning task in Experiment 2.Results are
shown separately for individuals scoring below and above the median on theUnEx subscale of theO-LIFE
(N = 94, error bars represent 1 SEM). Panel a plots the average reactions times to respond to all trails for the
two subject groups at each spatial frequency band. Panel b plots the time to respond with a False Alarm (FA)
and a Hit, and the average difference between the two for each subject (Difference) collapsed across spatial
frequency.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.g005
Table 4. Summary statistics (untransformed) for the questionnaire measures used in Experiment 2, stratified by % of signal stimuli expected dur-
ing the Perception Of Meaning task.
Group 1 Expecting 25% Group 2 Expecting 50% Group 3 Expecting 75%
M Med SD M Med SD M Med SD Range
N 31 33 31 —
Sex 74.2% female 69.7% female 71.0% female —
Hand preference 83.9% right hand 90.9% right hand 83.9% right hand —
Age 19.2 19.0 2.3 20.6 19.0 6.0 19.4 19.0 3.5 17–41
O-LIFE
Unusual Experiences 10.7 11.0 6.2 11.1 11.0 5.9 10.8 10.0 5.6 1–25
Cognitive Disorganization 12.1 12.0 6.0 11.6 12.0 4.9 13.0 14.0 5.3 0–23
Impulsive Nonconformity 10.1 10.0 4.3 10.7 11.0 4.6 11.0 11.0 4.5 2–24
Note: M = mean; Med = median; SD = standard deviation; Range = observed range; O-LIFE = Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences.
There were no signiﬁcant differences by Group on any of the variables listed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.t004
The Perception of Meaning
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615 March 8, 2016 15 / 26
In the second block of the regression, entering the remaining two schizotypy measures (Cog-
Dis and ImpNon in this experiment) into the regression equation did not make any significant
contribution to the predictive power of the unadjusted model when only UnEx was included (p
for all ΔR2> .05). Notably however, the addition of CogDis and ImpNon reduced the unique
influence of UnEx on sensitivity (D’) scores to be statistically insignificant. This effect was
largely due to the shared variance between CogDis and UnEx, with both variables in isolation
being significantly associated with a reduction in sensitivity on the POM (B = -0.02, SE B =
0.008, β = -.30, R2 = .09, p< .005, for the unadjusted regression model for CogDis predicting Dˈ
Table 5. Summary of four hierarchical blockwise regression analyses (forced entry) for schizotypymeasures and expectation predicting hit rates,
false alarm rates, sensitivity (D') and response criterion (β) on the Perception Of Meaning task in Experiment 2 (N = 95).
Hit rate False alarm rate
B SE B β B SE B β
Step 1. R2 = .02, p = .13 R2 = .09, p < .005
Constant 0.60 0.02 0.36 0.04
Unusual Experiences 0.003 0.002 .15 0.009 0.003 .30**
Step 2. ΔR2 = .0002, p = .99 ΔR2 = .02, p = .33
Constant 0.60 .03 0.33 0.05
Unusual Experiences 0.003 0.002 .16 0.007 0.004 .24*
Cognitive Disorganization 0.0001 0.002 .004 0.006 0.004 .18
Impulsive Nonconformity -0.0004 0.003 -.02 -0.002 0.005 -.06
Step 3. ΔR2 = .17, p < .0005 ΔR2 = .26, p < .0001
Constant 0.58 0.03 0.32 0.05
Unusual Experiences 0.003 0.002 .20 0.008 0.003 .28**
Cognitive Disorganization -0.001 0.002 -.04 0.004 0.003 .14
Impulsive Nonconformity -0.001 0.003 -.04 -0.004 0.004 -.10
Expectation 25% versus 50% -0.004 .02 -.02 -0.07 0.03 -.19
Expectation 75% versus 50% 0.08 0.02 .40*** 0.14 0.03 .40***
Sensitivity (D') Response criterion (β)
Step 1. R2 = .08, p < .005 R2 = .08, p < .005
Constant 1.43 0.10 0.67 0.03
Unusual Experiences -0.02 0.01 -.29** -0.01 0.002 -.29**
Step 2. ΔR2 = .04, p = .17 ΔR2 = .02, p = .42
Constant 1.54 0.13 0.69 0.04
Unusual Experiences -0.02 0.01 -.21 -0.005 0.002 -.24
Cognitive Disorganization -0.02 0.01 -.22 -0.004 0.003 -.16
Impulsive Nonconformity 0.01 0.01 .06 0.001 0.004 .05
Step 3. ΔR2 = .18, p < .0001 ΔR2 = .22, p < .0001
Constant 1.51 0.13 0.69 0.04
Unusual Experiences -0.02 0.01 -.24* -0.01 0.002 -.27*
Cognitive Disorganization -0.02 0.01 -.20 -0.003 0.003 -.12
Impulsive Nonconformity 0.01 0.01 .10 0.003 0.003 .09
Expectation 25% versus 50% 0.21 0.10 .22* 0.06 0.03 .20*
Expectation 75% versus 50% -0.26 0.10 -.27** -0.09 0.03 -.34**
* p < .05,
** p < .01,
*** p < .001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.t005
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(as opposed to UnEx as shown in Table 5)), but neither making a significant contribution when
considered together. Indeed, the correlation between UnEx and CogDis for the sample in
Experiment 2 was r = .478, p< .001, indicating around 23% shared variance. However, the tol-
erance (UnEx = .659, CogDis = .714) and Variance Inflation Factor (UnEx = 1.518, Cog-
Dis = 1.400) diagnostics indicated that multicollinearity was not an issue and correlations of
this magnitude between the UnEx and CogDis scales are consistent with published norms [85].
In the third and final block, dummy variables for the 25% and 75% expectation conditions
were entered into the regression equation, with the 50% condition used as the reference cate-
gory. Expectations strongly predicted all four performance measures on the POM, over and
above participants’ schizotypy scores (p for all ΔR2< .0005), with the higher expectation condi-
tion having relatively greater influence (see Table 5). Compared to the 50% control condition,
expecting fewer signal stimuli on the POM significantly increased sensitivity and response cri-
terion scores, but did not significantly impact hit or false alarm rates. In contrast, expecting
more signal stimuli than were presented significantly increased hit and false alarm rates, but
lowered sensitivity and response criterion scores. Importantly, the association between posi-
tive-psychotic schizotypy (UnEx) and performance on the POM remained significant even
after the effect of expectations had been accounted for. In the final model, a one standard devi-
ation increase in UnEx scores resulted in a .28 standard deviation increase in false alarm rates,
a .24 standard deviation decrease in sensitivity scores, and a .27 standard deviation decrease in
response criterion scores.
We also explored the interaction effects between schizotypy and the three expectation condi-
tions (2x3 mixed ANOVA), using dichotomous versions of each schizotypy variable based on
median splits. We did this particularly to enable a comparison between our findings and the study
of Cella et al., (2007). Unlike Cella et al. (2007), however, we did not find any significant interac-
tion effects for any of the schizotypy variables. In fact, whereas Cella et al., (2007) found that the
highUnEx group was especially likely to make more false alarms in the low expectation condition,
our results indicated a non-significant trend in the opposite direction, with the highUnEx group
more likely to make false alarms in the high expectation condition. Despite the non-significant
interactions, data from the analysis are plotted in Fig 7 (collapsed across spatial frequency brack-
ets). What the data do confirm are the reduced sensitivity and bias toward seeing a face (a lower β
value) in the higher positive-psychotic (UnEx) group compared to the lower group.
Fig 6. Mean performance on the Perception Of Meaning task in Experiment 2. Data shown separately
for individuals scoring below and above the median on theUnEx subscale of theO-LIFE (N = 94, error bars
represent ±95% confidence intervals). The reference line at 0.5 in panel a represents chance performance in
the yes-no task, whereas the reference line at β = 1.0 in panel c represents the point of no response bias for
an unbiased responder. A β value less than 1 indicates a bias toward saying a face was present in a noise-
only stimulus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.g006
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The effect of spatial frequency-band on POM performance
Finally, the role of spatial frequency on POM performance for individuals scoring below and
above the median on positive-psychotic schizotypy (collapsed across the three expectation con-
ditions) was examined. On the basis of Experiment 1, it was anticipated that schizotypy differ-
ences would be greatest at the lower spatial frequencies. Accordingly, the interaction between
UnEx and spatial frequency was of primary interest, though the main effect of spatial frequency
on POM hit rates, false alarm rates, sensitivity, and response criterion will be described first.
The analyses comprised 2 (UnExmedian split) × 4 (spatial frequency brackets) mixed ANO-
VAs, one for each POM performance measure, and are presented in Fig 8. In all cases,
Mauchly’s test indicated violations of the assumption of sphericity, so Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rections (ε = .637, .625, .887, and .804, for hit rates, false alarm rates, Dˈ, and β, respectively)
were applied.
Hit rates decreased significantly with increasing spatial frequency, F(3, 276) = 1247.7, p<
.001, η2P = .93, in a significant linear trend, F(1, 92) = 1884.7, p< .001, η
2
P = .95. Fig 8 indicates
that hit rates for the highest spatial frequency bracket of 8 c/deg dropped below chance perfor-
mance. Similarly, false alarm rates decreased, F(3, 276) = 223.5, p< .001, η2P = .71 in a signifi-
cant linear trend, F(1, 92) = 328.4, p< .001, η2P = .78, although at no spatial frequency brackets
were the mean false alarm rates greater than what would be expected by chance. Sensitivity
scores also decreased significantly with increasing spatial frequency, F(3, 270) = 25.4, p< .001,
η2P = .68, in a significant linear trend, F(1, 90) = 366.9, p< .001, η
2
P = .80. Lastly, response cri-
terion scores increased with spatial frequency, F(3, 276) = 265.0, p< 001, η2P = .74, in a statisti-
cally significant linear trend, F(1, 92) = 493.4, p< .001, η2P = .84.
Fig 7. Performance across the different expectation conditions, collapsed across spatial frequency,
in the Perception Of Meaning task. Data plotted separately for individuals scoring below and above the
median on the UnEx subscale of theO-LIFE (N = 94, error bars represent ±95% confidence intervals). The
reference lines in panels a and b represent chance performance (yes-no task), whereas the reference line at
β = 1 in panel d represents the point of no response bias for an unbiased responder. A β value less than 1
indicates a bias toward saying a face was present in a noise-only stimulus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.g007
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Contrary to the findings of Experiment 1, there were no significant positive-psychotic
schizotypy × spatial frequency interactions on hit rates, F(2, 276) = .034, p> .05, false alarm
rates, F(2, 276) = 1.1, p> .05, sensitivity, F(2, 270) = .046, p> .05, or response criterion scores,
F(2, 276) = 0.19, p> .05.
To summarise, the results of Experiment 2 reflect that the increased likelihood of giving a
false alarm in subjects with a high UnEx score (Exp 1) is related to a greater bias (β) toward see-
ing a face and a reduced sensitivity (Dˈ) to detecting a face when present and clarifies the initial
result. Both spatial frequency and expectation influence the data but there were no significant
interaction effects between schizotypy and these variables.
General Discussion
The work described in this paper examined the effect that personality has upon an individual’s
perception of meaning in noisy images.
Vision, and the brain more generally, is a noisy system. The process of deciding that a given
signal is meaningful at any point in time, or at any stage in the processing hierarchy, can be con-
sidered akin to a correlation in a statistical sense. Furthermore, there are both stimulus-based
and task-based factors which interact to influence the degree to which any particular neural
activity may be considered to be meaningful in the overall internal representation of the input.
Our work explores how the individual (as defined by the schizotypy personality scales)
influences these processes in the context of identifying meaning in a spatially degraded stimu-
lus. The results indicate that certain aspects of personality are related to a reduced sensitivity to
a stimulus and to an increased likelihood of seeing something when it is not there. This reduced
sensitivity is consistent with an increased internal noise level in some individuals, making it
Fig 8. Performance across the different spatial frequency brackets, collapsed across expectation, of
the Perception Of Meaning task.Data plotted separately for individuals scoring below and above the
median on the UnEx subscale of theO-LIFE (N = 94, error bars represent ±95% confidence intervals). The
reference lines in panels a and b represent chance performance (yes-no task), whereas the reference line at
β = 1 in panel d represents the point of no response bias for an unbiased responder. A β value less than 1
indicates a bias toward saying a face was present in a noise-only stimulus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150615.g008
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harder to see a near threshold stimulus [90]. The increased rate of false alarms, seeing some-
thing when it’s not there, is consistent with increased internal noise if it is also the case that
mistakes are made more often when there is more random activity [91], and those mistakes
have a perceptual consequence. This result is congruent with a similar approach taken examin-
ing the perception of paranormal believers and skeptics when asked to identify meaning in dif-
ferent configure stimuli and environmental situations [28, 29, 31].
The two experiments presented here showed that strongest predictor of a complex false
alarm (Experiment 1) was the UnEx dimension of schizotypy and that both sensitivity and bias
correlate with the UnEx dimension only when analysed in terms of signal detection theory
(Experiment 2). Put simply, this means that individuals high on this scale are less sensitive to
the presence of a meaning in noise, and more inclined to see meaning when none is there.
Our experiments manipulated the spatial frequency content of the images between centre
frequencies of 0.5cpd and 16cpd (2 - 8cpd in Experiment 2). When the stimuli were confined
to faces embedded in noise (Experiment 2), the effect of spatial frequency was not personality-
specific. In other words, making the task harder (shortening the duration) and more objective
(requiring a forced-choice response) had the effect of reducing the influence of the individual
on the task. Since the role of spatial frequency is probably most obvious relatively early in the
visual process, and the factors affecting an individual’s personality will have greater influence
on perception later in the process, this is perhaps not such a surprise.
Our manipulation of expectation of the number of images containing something meaning-
ful was analogous to Cella et al’s (2007) [16] design using a word-detection task. Our results,
however, were not entirely consistent with their findings. Both experiments found that raising
expectations increased the number of false alarms irrespective of schizotypy scores, but had lit-
tle effect on accuracy. In the same vein, Smith, Gosselin and Schyns (2012) found that when
observers were expecting to see a face in a noisy image then they often did, even if one was
never presented. Related to this result, the perceived rotation of an ambiguous stimulus
depends upon expectation and, to some degree, belief about the stimulus properties [20]. We
did not, however, replicate Cella et al’s (2007) interaction effects between UnEx scores and
expectation conditions, and actually observed a non-significant trend in the opposite direction;
with the high UnEx group more likely to make false alarms when they were presented with
fewer real images than they were expecting. That is, the production of false alarms in our study
was congruent with the direction of expectations, whereas Cella and colleagues found that their
high UnEx group was particularly more likely to make false alarms when they were presented
withmore real signal stimuli than they were expecting. The major distinction between the two
studies is that our signal stimuli were faces, whereas Cella et al., (2007) used common words, so
one explanation for the different findings may be the different neural mechanisms involved in
the perception of images and words (e.g. [92]). While our POM simply involves detection of
the signal stimulus (a face), the detection of a real word among non-words involves the added
cognitive step of recognition, given that both the signal and noise stimuli are made up of identi-
cal letter components with the difference lying only in the order of their arrangement. Argu-
ably, our task gives rise to perceptual false alarms which more closely resemble real-world
visual hallucinations than the false alarms elicited during the word-detection task of Cella et al.
(2007). Our findings are also more consistent with theoretical models of how expectations con-
tribute to the emergence of hallucinations [14].
One of the motivating factors for our use of the O-LIFE personality dimensions is its relation-
ship to hallucination and psychosis [36], and our stimuli were developed to use controlled exter-
nal noise as a tool to look at the operation of a decision-making system that is inherently noisy
in its operation [93]. An effect of increased cortical ‘noise’ has been commented upon in the con-
text of cortical oscillation in a working memory task and concurrent EEG recording both in
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high schizotypy individuals [94] and in schizophrenia [95]. While we do not suggest that the
task at hand here is directly related to the phase-locking of cortical oscillatory activity, the obser-
vation of increased noise can be considered to have more general effects outside that directly
related to oscillatory activity. The same authors also commented that increased noise may be a
product of dysfunctional top-down control on the activity which prevents a clear signal being
shaped and being contextually modulated in an appropriate way for the task at hand [94]. Both
of these influences on the resultant percept are, we suggest, affected by the current and ongoing
state of the individual as the task is carried out, and are therefore likely affected by personality.
Furthermore, it has been observed that cognitive control of intentional inhibition is reduced
in schizophrenia and shows a positive correlation with the severity of auditory hallucination;
more severe hallucinations appears related to reduced inhibition [96]. If the dimensional rela-
tionship to schizotypy holds then we would expect to see the decrease in D' and increased bias
measured in Experiment 2 as a function of reduced control or inhibition of the neural represen-
tation of the stimulus.
As mentioned above, it has been recently shown that individuals internal templates of
expected stimuli, or overall motivation regarding those stimuli, will affect whether they see
something when it is not there [13, 20, 97] or which of two bistable configurations are per-
ceived [9]; thus an internal template can be thought of as being superimposed onto an activity
‘surface’ to influence what sense may be made of that activity. This is akin to a particular belief
system (acting as a template) mediating the perception of meaning in meaninglessness [28, 29,
31]. Although our stimuli were different in terms of the noise structure and, importantly, the
random location of the face within the image frame [13, 20, 97], the idea of internal expectation
both in terms of frequency and particular spatial structure having an influence on the decision
is consistent with the current data. Furthermore, as an image becomes more ambiguous, as in
the case of a bistable representation of face/vase or the necker cube, there appears to be a pro-
gressively more activity in higher brain areas, measured using multivariate pattern analysis,
outside those generally associated with perception [98]. This activity outside visual cortex is
also correlated to the degree of delusional belief in the particular stimulus properties which in
turn affect the percept of an otherwise ambiguous rotating stimulus [20]. These results further
support the suggestion that personality may well have an opportunity to alter or enhance the
resultant percept, particularly when the stimulus itself does not facilitate a clear decision.
Conclusions
The principal result of this work is that the likelihood of a given individual to see meaning in a
noisy image is measurably related to their personality. The particular novelty of the current
result is that we have shown that this individual difference is a not a product of suggestibility,
but a genuine and consistent bias in some people toward saying a stimulus is present when
there is only noise. This bias is correlated to a reduced sensitivity to the actual presence of a
noisy stimulus leading to the suggestion that this mistaken perception of meaning is the prod-
uct of a noisier system and the measurable consequence of a false correlation of that noise at an
early stage in the system. We further suggest that this may provide the basis for the develop-
ment of an hallucination, and may also explain why some abstract art can be so compelling for
some, and yet leave others cold.
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